Uri Avnery *, 8/25/2003

A Drug for the Addict
It was a putsch. Like any classic putsch, it was carried out by a

group of officers: Sharon, Mofaz, Ya'alon and the army top brass.

It is no secret that the military party (the only really functioning

party in Israel) objected to the hudna (truce) from the first moment,

much as it opposed the Road Map. Its powerful propaganda apparatus,

which includes all the Israeli media, spread the message: "The hudna

is a disaster! Every day of the hudna is a bad day! The reduction of

violence to almost zero is a great misfortune: under cover of the truce,

the terrorist organizations are recovering and rearming! Every terrorist

strike avoided today will hit us much harder tomorrow!"

The army command was like an addict deprived of his drug. It was

forbidden to carry out the action it wanted. It was just about to crush

the intifada, victory was just around the corner, all that was needed

was just one final decisive blow, and that would have been that.

The military was upset when it saw the new hope that took hold of

the Israeli public, the bullish mood of the stock exchange, the rise in

value of the shekel, the return of the masses to the entertainment

centers, the signs of optimism on both sides. In effect, It was a

spontaneous popular vote against the military policy.

Ariel Sharon realized that if this went on, reality would overturn his

long-term plans. Therefore, right at the beginning of the hudna, he

adopted three immediate goals:

First, to topple Abu-Mazen as soon as possible. Mahmud Abbas

had become the darling of George Bush, a welcome guest at the White

House. The unique standing of Sharon in Washington was in danger.

The pair Bush-Sharon, which was mutating into a single Busharon unit,

was in danger of becoming a triangle: Bush-Sharon-Abbas. There is no

greater danger to Sharon's plans.

Second, to wipe out the Road Map in its infancy. The Map obliged

Sharon to remove immediately about 80 settlement outposts, freeze all

settlements, stop the building of the wall and withdraw the army from

all West Bank towns. Sharon never dreamt of fulfilling even one of

these obligations.

Third, to put an end to the hudna and give the army back its

freedom of action in all the Palestinian territories.

The question was how this could be achieved without a trace of

suspicion attaching itself to Sharon. The great majority of Israelis, who

had greeted the hudna, could not possibly be allowed to suspect that

their own leaders were responsible for extinguishing this glimmer of

hope. Even more important, it was imperative that no such pernicious

idea should enter the innocent head of the good George W. All the

blame must fall on the Palestinians, so that the affection for Abu-

Mazen would turn into contempt and hatred.

The means for attaining this goal were selected with great care,

taking into account the simplistic world of Bush with its Good Guys

and Bad Guys. The Bad Guys are the terrorists. Therefore, it was

advisable to kill Hamas and Jihad militants. That would not upset

Bush. In the eyes of the President, to kill terrorists is a Good Thing.

And as a result, the Palestinians would be compelled to break the

hudna.

This is how it happened:

On August 8, Israeli soldiers killed two Hamas militants in Nablus.

But the retaliation was restrained: on August 12, a Hamas suicide

bomber killed one Israeli in Rosh-Ha'ayin and another bomber killed

one person in the Ariel settlement. Both suicide bombers came from

Nablus. Hamas announced that the hudna would continue. On August

14, the Israeli army killed Muhammad Seeder, head of the military wing

of Hamas in Hebron. Five days later, on August 19, a suicide bomber

from Hebron blew himself up in a Jerusalem bus, killing 20 men,

women and children. Two days later, on August 21, the army

assassinated Isma'il Abu-Shanab, the fourth ranking leader of Hamas.

This time it was not even possible even to pin on the victim the

appellation "ticking bomb", as is usual in such cases. The man was a

well-known political leader. Why was he of all people chosen for

assassination? A military correspondent on Israeli TV made a slip of

the tongue: Abu-Shanab was killed, he said, because he was

"available". Meaning, he was an easy target because he did not go

underground after the bus bombing, as did the leaders of the military

wing.

This time, at long last, the aim was achieved. The Palestinian

organizations announced that they were calling off the hudna. Sharon

and Co. rejoiced. Within hours the Israeli army had again penetrated

into the centers of the Palestinian towns, starting an orgy of arrests

and house demolitions (more than 40 in a single day).

The addict leapt for the drug. His crisis was over, the officers could

do all the things they had been prevented from doing for nine long

weeks.

But the situation will not revert to the status quo ante intifada, so to

speak. The attacks and killings will be more numerous and more cruel.

The construction of the Wall deep in the Palestinian territories will be

accelerated, along with the building activity in the settlements.

The army propaganda machine is already preparing the public for

the "expulsion of Arafat". "Expulsion" is a euphemism produced by the

"verbal laundry" section of the army, one of its most creative

departments. The intention is not to expel the leader from his Ramallah

compound, nor from Palestine, but from this world. The reaction of the

Palestinians and the whole Arab world can be predicted. It would be a

historic point of no return, perhaps eliminating the chances of peace for

generations.

And the Americans? Never has the Bush administration looked so

pathetic as here and now. The unfortunate Colin Powell arouses

compassion with his stuttering and his emissary, John Wolf, a wolf

without teeth, will go the way of all his predecessors.

After the implosion of the new order in Afghanistan and the classic

guerilla war now engulfing the universally hated occupation regime in

Iraq, the collapse of the Road Map will put an end to any presidential

pretensions. It is much easier to have one's picture taken in the

uniform of a glorious victor with a background of army extras than to

steer the ship of state.

The renewal of the cycle of violence will, of course, exacerbate the

economic depression in Israel. The crisis will deepen. Together with

the hudna and the Road Map, tourism, foreign investment and the

recovery will also die.

The economy, too, is an addict who needs his drug: nine billion

dollars in US government loan guarantees are waiting for Sharon in

Washington. That should be enough for the political and military elite.

Only the poor will become poorer. But who cares?

All this is being done without consulting the Israeli public. There is

no open discussion, no debate in the tame media, the silent Knesset

and the cabinet of marionettes. That's what makes it a putsch.

To sum up: The road Map is dead, because Sharon was against it

from the beginning, Bush saw it only as a photo opportunity on a nice

background and Abu-Mazen did not get from Israel and the US

anything that he could present as a Palestinian achievement.

What will happen now? After the shedding of yet more blood and

many tears, the two peoples will arrive once more at the conviction that

it is better to come to an agreement and make peace. Then they will

be compelled to learn the lesson of the last chapter: It must all start

from the end. Only after the picture of the final settlement clearly

emerges can one deal with the immediate problems. Anything else

would be a road map to the abyss.

________________
* Dear Chevra,

Uri Avnery (veteran Israeli peace activist, former member of Knesset, former publisher/editor of the biggest Israeli news weekly of the '70s and 80's, recipent of the "alternative Nobel Prize) on the collapse of the ceasefire.

Shalom, Arthur

GUSH SHALOM pob 3322, Tel-Aviv 61033 www.gush-shalom.org
Uri Avnery

23.8.03
A Drug for the Addict
It was a putsch. Like any classic putsch, it was carried out by a

group of officers: Sharon, Mofaz, Ya'alon and the army top brass.

It is no secret that the military party (the only really functioning

party in Israel) objected to the hudna (truce) from the first moment,

much as it opposed the Road Map. Its powerful propaganda apparatus,

which includes all the Israeli media, spread the message: "The hudna

is a disaster! Every day of the hudna is a bad day! The reduction of

violence to almost zero is a great misfortune: under cover of the truce,

the terrorist organizations are recovering and rearming! Every terrorist

strike avoided today will hit us much harder tomorrow!"

The army command was like an addict deprived of his drug. It was

forbidden to carry out the action it wanted. It was just about to crush

the intifada, victory was just around the corner, all that was needed

was just one final decisive blow, and that would have been that.

The military was upset when it saw the new hope that took hold of

the Israeli public, the bullish mood of the stock exchange, the rise in

value of the shekel, the return of the masses to the entertainment

centers, the signs of optimism on both sides. In effect, It was a

spontaneous popular vote against the military policy.

Ariel Sharon realized that if this went on, reality would overturn his

long-term plans. Therefore, right at the beginning of the hudna, he

adopted three immediate goals:

First, to topple Abu-Mazen as soon as possible. Mahmud Abbas

had become the darling of George Bush, a welcome guest at the White

House. The unique standing of Sharon in Washington was in danger.

The pair Bush-Sharon, which was mutating into a single Busharon unit,

was in danger of becoming a triangle: Bush-Sharon-Abbas. There is no

greater danger to Sharon's plans.

Second, to wipe out the Road Map in its infancy. The Map obliged

Sharon to remove immediately about 80 settlement outposts, freeze all

settlements, stop the building of the wall and withdraw the army from

all West Bank towns. Sharon never dreamt of fulfilling even one of

these obligations.

Third, to put an end to the hudna and give the army back its

freedom of action in all the Palestinian territories.

The question was how this could be achieved without a trace of

suspicion attaching itself to Sharon. The great majority of Israelis, who

had greeted the hudna, could not possibly be allowed to suspect that

their own leaders were responsible for extinguishing this glimmer of

hope. Even more important, it was imperative that no such pernicious

idea should enter the innocent head of the good George W. All the

blame must fall on the Palestinians, so that the affection for Abu-

Mazen would turn into contempt and hatred.

The means for attaining this goal were selected with great care,

taking into account the simplistic world of Bush with its Good Guys

and Bad Guys. The Bad Guys are the terrorists. Therefore, it was

advisable to kill Hamas and Jihad militants. That would not upset

Bush. In the eyes of the President, to kill terrorists is a Good Thing.

And as a result, the Palestinians would be compelled to break the

hudna.

This is how it happened:

On August 8, Israeli soldiers killed two Hamas militants in Nablus.

But the retaliation was restrained: on August 12, a Hamas suicide

bomber killed one Israeli in Rosh-Ha'ayin and another bomber killed

one person in the Ariel settlement. Both suicide bombers came from

Nablus. Hamas announced that the hudna would continue. On August

14, the Israeli army killed Muhammad Seeder, head of the military wing

of Hamas in Hebron. Five days later, on August 19, a suicide bomber

from Hebron blew himself up in a Jerusalem bus, killing 20 men,

women and children. Two days later, on August 21, the army

assassinated Isma'il Abu-Shanab, the fourth ranking leader of Hamas.

This time it was not even possible even to pin on the victim the

appellation "ticking bomb", as is usual in such cases. The man was a

well-known political leader. Why was he of all people chosen for

assassination? A military correspondent on Israeli TV made a slip of

the tongue: Abu-Shanab was killed, he said, because he was

"available". Meaning, he was an easy target because he did not go

underground after the bus bombing, as did the leaders of the military

wing.

This time, at long last, the aim was achieved. The Palestinian

organizations announced that they were calling off the hudna. Sharon

and Co. rejoiced. Within hours the Israeli army had again penetrated

into the centers of the Palestinian towns, starting an orgy of arrests

and house demolitions (more than 40 in a single day).

The addict leapt for the drug. His crisis was over, the officers could

do all the things they had been prevented from doing for nine long

weeks.

But the situation will not revert to the status quo ante intifada, so to

speak. The attacks and killings will be more numerous and more cruel.

The construction of the Wall deep in the Palestinian territories will be

accelerated, along with the building activity in the settlements.

The army propaganda machine is already preparing the public for

the "expulsion of Arafat". "Expulsion" is a euphemism produced by the

"verbal laundry" section of the army, one of its most creative

departments. The intention is not to expel the leader from his Ramallah

compound, nor from Palestine, but from this world. The reaction of the

Palestinians and the whole Arab world can be predicted. It would be a

historic point of no return, perhaps eliminating the chances of peace for

generations.

And the Americans? Never has the Bush administration looked so

pathetic as here and now. The unfortunate Colin Powell arouses

compassion with his stuttering and his emissary, John Wolf, a wolf

without teeth, will go the way of all his predecessors.

After the implosion of the new order in Afghanistan and the classic

guerilla war now engulfing the universally hated occupation regime in

Iraq, the collapse of the Road Map will put an end to any presidential

pretensions. It is much easier to have one's picture taken in the

uniform of a glorious victor with a background of army extras than to

steer the ship of state.

The renewal of the cycle of violence will, of course, exacerbate the

economic depression in Israel. The crisis will deepen. Together with

the hudna and the Road Map, tourism, foreign investment and the

recovery will also die.

The economy, too, is an addict who needs his drug: nine billion

dollars in US government loan guarantees are waiting for Sharon in

Washington. That should be enough for the political and military elite.

Only the poor will become poorer. But who cares?

All this is being done without consulting the Israeli public. There is

no open discussion, no debate in the tame media, the silent Knesset

and the cabinet of marionettes. That's what makes it a putsch.

To sum up: The road Map is dead, because Sharon was against it

from the beginning, Bush saw it only as a photo opportunity on a nice

background and Abu-Mazen did not get from Israel and the US

anything that he could present as a Palestinian achievement.

What will happen now? After the shedding of yet more blood and

many tears, the two peoples will arrive once more at the conviction that

it is better to come to an agreement and make peace. Then they will

be compelled to learn the lesson of the last chapter: It must all start

from the end. Only after the picture of the final settlement clearly

emerges can one deal with the immediate problems. Anything else

would be a road map to the abyss.

__________________

Avneri is a veteran Israeli peace activist who was an anti-British terrorist before 1947, the editor/publisher of the largest newsweekly in Israel n the 1970s and 80s, former Member of Knesset, and recipient of the " alternative Nobel Prize."